WITH the second world war entering upon its penultimate, if not final, stage, the ill-fated Peace Conference of 1919 comes out of the shadows; and is again being examined, judged, and weighed for what it can give of information, instruction, and warning for the guidance of the victors. Opinion about the treaty which came out of this Conference has gone through many phases in the.past twenty-four years. After the hopeful enthusiasm with which the treaty was greeted by the general public had waned, as it became apparent that these hopes were misplaced, the view .that it imposed a Punic peace which the Germans were justified in circumventing and resisting by every available expedient was so vigorously advanced, especially in the United States, that all opinion critical of these conclusions, was under a veritable taboo. This became a stock argument in all pleas for appeasement. According to this theory France was the villain of the peace; it was provisions of the treaty upon which she was insistent, supplemented by provocative courses following the war, that put Germany, which desired to be peaceful, in a state of mind that explained, and even justified, the rise of Nazism and the emergence of Hitler as a tribal god.
the victorious nations to determine the terms of peace which they were prepared to offer, to be followed by a real peace conference--this would have been the logical course; and there will always be those who will contend that had it been followed a workable and durable peace would have been obtained.
There is the very different theory that peace, obtained along traditional lines of negotiations, would have been no more enduring than that which was reached by other methods, in view of the arrogant denial of complete defeat by the German army leaders and their propagandists; and that, taking the long view, Wilson's course in intervening and virtually taking charge of the shaping of the peace, while it failed for the moment, has borne fruit in the now all but universal determination to make a peace this time which will establish and make fully operative those principles of a wide and enduring peace which fell by the wayside in the interval between the two wars because mankind was not ready for them, though for a brief period lip service was paid them. There is the certainty that the reorganization of the world, following Allied victory, will be along lines deriving from the "great experiment," as Lord Cecil has termed it, which was initiated when the keeping of the world's peace was entrusted to the incomplete and untried machinery of the League of Nations.
This article is not an attempt fully to appraise the work and the worth of the Paris Peace Conference; and what has been said thus far does not go beyond the purpose of furnishing a background for the consideration of a by-product of the Conference which has exercised a profound influence upon the constitutional development of the British nations and through this has raised questions which may again prove troublesome when post-war reconstruction becomes the most pressing of international problems. The Peace Conference (the term has to be accepted though strictly speaking it is a misnomer), was a catalytic agent which broke up the traditional Empire and replaced it with a brotherhood of nations, though both popular usage and legal d•finition have been slow to record the change. The record of Canada's approach to the Conference, the nature and extent of its participation in Conference activities and decisions, and the subsequent validation of these innovations, constitute the most important chapter in the history of Canadian constitutional development.
It is a record with which Canadians who are interested in the question of Canada's status and Canadian responsibilities should be familiar; but heretofore the story could only be got in its entirety by the tedious process of going to the original sources, as noted in a wide variety of volumes. Fortunately this is no longer necessary. Professor G. P. deT. Glazebrook, at the instance of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, has written a compact and readable account of the part Canada played in the Paris Peace Conference; and has accompanied the record with a commentary of value upon the effects of these activities in Canada and elsewhere. • This monograph of some 150 pages should be given a wide reading in Canada; it will throw light upon dark places in the nation's knowledge and thinking. The advance guard of the Canadian contingent, six in number, iourneyed from London to Paris on Saturday, January 11, 1919, and took up residence in the Majestic Hotel. Sir Robert Borden was in the party; his colleagues remained in London for a few days.
All the British Prime Ministers--Lloyd George, Botha, Borden, Hughes, and Massey--seized the occasion to be early on the ground. On Sunday night Sir Maurice Hankey (now Lord Hankey) broke the news that at a preliminary meeting that day of representatives of the Great Powers, objections, amounting to a veto, had been taken to recognizing the Dominions as entitled to direct representation. I well recall the sensation among the Dominion groups which followed the receipt of these bad tidings. Most accounts put the sole responsibility for making this objection upon President Wilson and Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State; but the report that was current that evening indicated a very critical attitude upon the part of the French as well. Algiers, they suggested, was as much entitled to representation as the Dominions; and this was taken up by the French press which harped upon the topic for days. But it was not the French opposition that disturbed the Dominion Prime Ministers; they knew that, while United States opposition, if persisted in, would be fatal to the Dominion rights, the French would give way if American consent were secured. There were excited informal discussions by the Dominion groups, and it was arranged that a meeting should be held in the morning in Sir Robert's room, after which Lloyd George was to be seen.
Information about this meeting which came to me unofficially at that time was that Sir Robert was for a fight to the finish and that he remained of this opinion even after the other Dominion Ministers--including Mr. Hughes, Australia's fighting man, and General Botha, and the indomitable General Smuts--conceded defeat, saying that the fight was lost unless a compromise allowing a single representative from each Dominion could be arranged. But Sir Robert says in his Memoirs a that when they weakened he gave up also. Far be it from me to question the diary, but it must be said that there was nothing in Sir Robert's bearing or manner to suggest that he was prepared to strike his flag. Sir Robert's whole project of a Commonwealth of autonomous British nations, which had become his first concern, was on the anvil that morning. In the despatch to the Canadian Department of Public Information which duly appeared in the Canadian newspapers, this highly explosive and dangerous incident was treated as though it was nothing more than a slight disagreement in a Sunday School meeting. The sending of the despatch was held up for a day as it had to be formally passed upon by Sir Robert Borden and then by Lloyd George. I had succeeded in writing it with all due diplomatic reserve, for my copy came back to me without change. Eight years after the signing of the Peace Treaty and one year after the Imperial Peace Conference had registered its opinion about that mistake, I heard a very eminent British constitutional authority, with whom Mr. Sifton had crossed swords at Paris, admit that this action, which was probably taken with his consent, had had effects other than had been expected. In June, 1027, a
